Totes & Trademarks: Inside the Ongoing Battle Between Trader Joe’s and Its Union
- Harrison Lavelle
- Nov 12
- 6 min read

[1]
Overview
On September 8, 2025, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revived a trademark infringement lawsuit brought by Trader Joe’s Company (“Trader Joe’s”) against Trader Joe’s United (“TJU”)—the grocery store chain’s employee union.[2] The decision is the latest installment in an ongoing battle over products sold by TJU which allegedly infringe Trader Joe’s federally registered trademarks.[3] The dispute raises important issues at the juncture of federal labor law and intellectual property law.[4]
Background
This case concerns a trademark dispute between Trader Joe’s and TJU. In June 2023, TJU started selling allegedly infringing merchandise online.[5] Specifically, TJU sold reusable tote bags which allegedly used Trader Joe’s typed and stylized word marks, typeface, red coloring, and circular logo design.[6]
After discovering the sales, Trader Joe’s sent TJU a cease-and-desist letter asking the union to stop selling the infringing merchandise.[7] TJU refused, alleging that Trader Joe’s Lanham Act claims constituted retaliation against its unionization activities.[8] In response, Trader Joe’s filed a second demand clarifying that its request dealt only with the unauthorized commercial use of the company’s trademarks—not with references to Trader Joe’s used to identify the union and its organizing goals.[9]
In July 2023, Trader Joe’s brought suit against TJU alleging various violations of the Lanham Act, including trademark infringement; unfair competition, false association, and false designation of origin; and trademark dilution.[10] Trader Joe’s also alleged unfair competition under the California Business and Professions Code, as well as common law trademark infringement.[11]
In its complaint, Trader Joe’s claimed that TJU’s unauthorized use of its trademarks caused irreparable harm to its business, reputation, and goodwill.[12] Trader Joe’s asked the court to issue an injunction barring TJU from selling merchandise using the trademarks.[13] Additionally, Trader Joe’s sought the destruction of all existing merchandise and the recovery of damages.[14]
TJU moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that consumers would not be led to believe that its merchandise was sponsored or endorsed by Trader Joe’s.[15] TJU also alleged that Trader Joe’s had filed its lawsuit to retaliate against the union in a protracted labor dispute.[16] In support of the second allegation, TJU relied on the fact that Trader Joe’s had filed suit just days after the National Labor Relations Board handed down a complaint against it for unfair labor practices.[17] Accordingly, TJU argued that the Norris LaGuardia Act (“NLGA”)—which limits federal courts’ ability to issue injunctions in certain labor disputes—deprived the court of jurisdiction to grant Trader Joe’s request for permanent injunctive relief.[18]
The district court, Judge Hernán D. Vera presiding, granted TJU’s motion to dismiss.[19] It rejected Trader Joe’s trademark infringement and unfair competition claims, finding that the challenged merchandise created no plausible likelihood of consumer confusion.[20] To buttress its ruling, the district court pointed to technical differences between Trader Joe’s and TJU’s marks as well as the fact that TJU clearly sought to distinguish itself from Trader Joe’s.[21]
The district court also agreed with TJU, holding the NLGA barred the court from entering the requested injunctive relief because Trader Joe’s suit arose out of a national labor dispute.[22] On appeal, the three-judge panel unanimously reversed the district court, concluding that it mistakenly dismissed the company’s trademark infringement and trademark dilution claims.[23] The panel also concluded that it was unclear whether NLGA barred Trader Joe’s request for injunctive relief in this case.[24]
The 9th Circuit’s Reasoning
Trademark Infringement
In evaluating Trader Joe’s trademark infringement claim, the panel considered whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ in the marketplace was likely to be confused as to the origin of TJU’s products.[25] Specifically, the panel relied on the likelihood-of-confusion test established in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats.[26] The Sleekcraft test focuses on eight factors: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the proximity of the goods; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) the marketing channels used; (6) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) the likelihood of expansion of product lines.[27]
Recognizing that dismissal of trademark suits at the pleading stage is generally disapproved of, the panel considered each of the eight factors in turn.[28] The panel found that the first three factors weighed strongly in favor of Trader Joe’s: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the proximity of the goods; and (3) the similarity of the marks.[29]
With regard to the first factor, concerning the strength of the mark, the panel explained that “the stronger a mark—meaning the more likely it is to be remembered and associated in the public mind with the mark’s owner—the greater the protection it is accorded by the trademark laws.”[30] TJU never contested the fact that Trader Joe’s mark is strong.[31]
With regard to the second factor, concerning the proximity of the goods, the panel noted that “related goods are generally more likely than unrelated goods to confuse the public as to the producers of the goods.”[32] The panel determined the relatedness of goods by examining whether the products were (1) complementary; (2) sold to the same class of purchasers; and (3) similar in use and function.[33]
While reusable tote bags were the only product sold by both Trader Joe’s and TJU when the suit was filed, the panel found that the other items sold by TJU (including the t-shirts and mugs) were complementary enough to tote bags to cause consumer confusion about their origin.[34] Even if its analysis were limited to the tote bags, however, the panel reasoned that they, too, satisfied the test because they were sold to the same class of purchasers (the general public) and served the same function (being a valuable source of organic marketing).[35]
With regard to the third factor, concerning the similarity of the marks, the panel explained that the likelihood of confusion increases as similarities between two marks increase.[36] The panel relied on three principles to evaluate similarity: “(1) appearance, sound, and meaning; (2) marks should be considered in their entirety and as they appear in the marketplace; and (3) similarities weigh more heavily than differences.”[37]
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the panel placed particular emphasis on the fact that both parties’ marks used the same lettering, color, font, and circular design.[38] The panel also rejected TJU’s argument that its marks are dissimilar because they criticize Trader Joe’s labor practices, reasoning that reasonable consumers may not associate the mark with the union’s organizational goals.[39]
The panel found that the remaining five Sleekcraft factors were neutral and were therefore outweighed by the factors supporting Trader Joe’s claim that a reasonably prudent consumer would be confused about the origin of TJU’s merchandise featuring its marks.[40]
Trademark Dilution
Next, the panel considered Trader Joe’s trademark dilution by blurring claim.[41] For this trademark dilution claim, the panel had to evaluate whether “the association arising from the similarity between [TJU’s mark] and [Trader Joe’s mark]…impairs the distinctiveness of [Trader Joe’s mark].”[42] However, the panel did not conduct a detailed analysis, finding instead that the district court erred in rejecting Trader Joe’s claim based on the nominative fair use defense where TJU had never raised that defense below.[43]
NLGA
Finally, the panel reviewed the district court’s conclusion that the NLGA barred it from issuing a permanent injunction against TJU.[44] The NLGA bars courts from granting injunctive relief in cases “involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”[45] The NLGA applies where “the employer-employee relationship is the matrix of the controversy.”[46] Here, the panel found that the district court prematurely determined that it lacked jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief—noting that the record was unclear as to the significance of the timing of Trader Joe’s lawsuit.[47]
Implications
Aside from clarifying the Sleekcraft test, the panel’s decision is significant because of its careful balancing of the competing interests raised by the Lanham Act and the NLGA. The panel refrained from interpreting the NLGA’s “involving or growing out of a labor dispute” language to effectively exempt union infringers from liability under the Lanham Act.[48] At the same time, however, the panel left open the possibility that the NLGA could ultimately be found to bar the issuance of injunctive relief in this suit.[49]
References
[1] Photo by Mike Mozart, Trader Joe's, Stamford, CT, Flickr (June 23, 2016) (CC BY 2.0) https://www.flickr.com/photos/jeepersmedia/27759576572/in/photolist-2hF74Kk-2ocihsR-2mYpgNu-JoWzbQ-8tHwFu-2ofkGR3-Ji25Zb-J2r6xm-JkfYWi-HvTjpA-5AWu6-2mfgcXL-Ji2qtb-nd4G79-FpzvR4-HvToM3-J2r6PU-Ji2s2S-JkoZK6-nf7pfg-fKNxUy-2ggQiRE-2QXU5M-3k67k6-Ji2qGY
[2] See Jonathan Stempel, Trader Joe's Can Sue Employee Union over Trademarks, US Appeals Court Rules, Reuters, (Sep. 9, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/trader-joes-can-sue-employee-union-over-trademarks-us-appeals-court-rules-2025-09-08/ (explaining 9th Circuit’s holding).
[3] See Trader Joe’s Co. v. Trader Joe’s United, 150 F.4th 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2025).
[4] See id. at 1044.
[5] See id. at 1046.
[6] See id.
[7] See id. at 1047.
[8] See id.
[9] See id.
[10] See id.
[11] See id.
[12] See id.
[13] See id.
[14] See id.
[15] See id. at 1047-48.
[16] See id. at 1047.
[17] See id.
[18] See id. at 1044, 1045, 1048.
[19] See Stempel, supra note 2.
[20] See Trader Joe’s Co., 150 F.4th at 1048.
[21] See id.
[22] See id.
[23] See id.
[24] See id.
[25] See id.
[26] See id. at 1045.
[27] See id. at 1048-49.
[28] See id. at 1049.
[29] See id. at 1054.
[30] See id. at 1049.
[31] See id.
[32] See id.
[33] See id. at 1049-50.
[34] See id. at 1050.
[35] See id.
[36] See id. at 1051.
[37] See id.
[38] See id.
[39] See id.
[40] See id. at 1054.
[41] See id.
[42] See id.
[43] See id. at 1055.
[44] See id.
[45] See id.
[46] See id.
[47] See id. at 1055-56.
[48] See id. at 1055.
[49] See id. at 1055-56.
